University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1998

The Demand for Human Cloning
Richard A. Posner
Eric A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner & Eric Posner, "The Demand for Human Cloning," 27 Hofstra Law Review 579 (1998).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

THE DEMAND FOR HUMAN CLONING
Eric A. Posner*and RichardA. Posner**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The news that a sheep ("Dolly") had been created by cloning adult
nonreproductive tissue' has given rise to speculation that it may soon be
feasible to create human beings in the same way. In fact, substantial
technical obstacles remain to be overcome,2 but no doubt they will be in

time. The prospect of human cloning is ferociously controversial.3 The
controversy presupposes that if human cloning were safe, reliable, and
permitted there would be a demand for it. For if there would be no demand, why worry? More realistically, if the demand would be slight, or
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The Authors thank Hector Acevedo-Polanco, Emlyn Eisenach, Sorin Feiner, Gertrud
Fremling, Dan Kahan, Leo Katz, William Landes, Martha Nussbaum, Charlene Posner, Reed
Shuldiner, Robert Trivers, and participants in the University of Chicago's Workshop on Rational
Models in the Social Sciences for many helpful comments on a previous draft of this Essay, and
Susan Burgess, Acevedo-Polanco, Feiner, and Brady Mickelsen for helpful research assistance.
This is an expanded version of The Demandfor Human Cloning, which originally appeared in Clones and Clones:Facts and FantasiesAbout Human Cloning (Martha C. Nussbaum &
Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998) and is reprinted here with permission of the Authors and W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. All footnotes have been adapted to conform with law review citation style.
1. See I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derivedfrom Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,
385 NATURE 810 (1997). For a popular treatment, see Ruth Macklin, Human Cloning? Don't Just
Say No, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 64, 64. The technique involves replacing the
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limited to situations that do not provoke acute concern on the part of
people who worry about human cloning, there would be no reason to incur the bother and expense of prohibiting it out of fear of monstrous
social consequences.
We therefore limit our discussion to the demand for human cloning. We assume that a safe and effective procedure will be developed
that enables a man or a woman to produce a perfect genetic copy of
himself or herself (or of his or her child-or of anyone, for that matter),
a copy that would bear the same genetic relation to the cloned individual
that one identical twin bears to the other. We ask: Who will want to take
advantage of this procedure, and with what effects? In economic terminology, we focus on the private benefits and the social costs of human
cloning.
We do not consider the demand for cloning in countries in which
the demand for children is much greater, and the status of women much
lower, than in the United States and its peer countries. Nor do we consider the moral and legal issues presented by cloning, such as whether
cloning should be permitted without the permission of the person cloned
and who would have parental rights over the clone of a person involuntarily cloned. These are not absurd questions; cloning need not be an invasive procedure, since a person sheds many cells every day, any of
which might be cloned.
Nor do we attempt to factor into our analysis the sheer "weirdness"
of human cloning, a consideration that might be thought to depress the
demand. Not only is this consideration analytically intractable, but it is
probably only transitional. A product or service that is new and rare
tends to be thought weird, and its diffusion is resisted. But if it is a
source of potentially substantial net benefits, its use will spread, and
when some critical mass is reached the aversion will drop away and a
more rapid diffusion begin.
We are tempted to put to one side the case in which a couple clones
its dying child in order to produce a closer replacement than it would
get by having another child in the usual way, or in which an infertile
couple clones one of the partners in lieu of adoption or (if it is a heterosexual couple and the man is the infertile one) of artificial insemination,
or in which cloning is used because one of the partners has a serious genetic disease or weakness. In these situations-situations of
"reproductive failure" in a broad sense-cloning might seem to be
simply a substitute for the other methods of obtaining a child that do not
involve sexual intercourse between the parents. If the demand for human cloning were limited to these situations, the procedure might not
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seem worthy of greater controversy than in vitro fertilization of longfrozen ova. (Not that modem reproductive technology is uncontroversial; our point is only that human cloning considered merely as an alternative reproductive technology need not raise particularly novel issues.)
Yet we shall see later that this may be mistaken-that cloning the infertile could have the radical consequence of eventually eliminating
sexual reproduction. The critical difference between cloning and other
reproductive technologies is not that cloning involves choosing what
genes one's child shall have; such choices are within the horizon of reproductive technology wholly apart from the Dolly trick of cloning an
adult nonreproductive cell. The critical difference is that the other
methods require fertility and cloning does not; or, more precisely, that
cloning does not require that the biological parent be fertile, but only
that there be a womb, not necessarily the genetic parent's womb, capable of incubating the clone embryo.
Since gene selection is not limited to cloning, what we have to say
about the demand for cloning may well have implications for other reproductive technologies. But we shall generally ignore those implications. Comparison with in vitro fertilization and the other now-familiar
techniques for overcoming problems of fertility must not be allowed to
obscure the fundamental point: that the demand for human cloning
would in all likelihood not be limited to cases of "reproductive failure,"
broadly construed to include the child who dies before reaching adulthood and the parent who fears transmitting a bad gene. The amplification of this point is the main contribution of this Essay.
The principal reason not to expect the demand for human cloning
to be limited to cases of reproductive failure lies in evolutionary biology. A gene's frequency depends on the rate at which the organisms that
are carrying the gene reproduce themselves. In the word "themselves" is
the key to understanding the genetic appeal, as it were, of cloning. In
sexual reproduction, a gene of one of the parents has only a 50 percent
chance of being reproduced; with cloning, it is 100 percent. We might
incautiously expect, therefore, an evolved preference for cloning, similar to the evolved preference of most people for their children (who
have on average 50 percent of each parent's genes) over their nephews
(who have on average 25 percent of each uncle's or aunt's genes). Yet
we do not find a preference for cloning. The reason is that reproduction
by cloning was not an available choice for human beings during the period in which the genetic makeup of the human race-the basis of our
instinctual preferences and aversions-reached its present state. The
likely reason that this choice did not evolve is that the reshuffling of the
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genes with every generation, which we get with sexual reproduction,
provides protection against co-evolving parasites.4 From the standpoint
of inclusive fitness, the benefits apparently exceed the costs, for
"natural" human cloning is limited to the rare case of identical twins.
The fact that a particular course of conduct might increase the frequency of one's genes doesn't mean that it will be undertaken. Otherwise the demand to be a donor to a sperm bank would be much greater
than it is, for it is an extremely cheap way for a man to increase the frequency of his genes. Since there were no sperm banks in the period in
which human beings evolved to their present state, a proclivity to donate
to such banks has never evolved. Likewise there is no innate proclivity
to clone oneself because cloning was not an option for people in the period in which we evolved to our present state. But, equally important,
there is no innate aversion to cloning oneself, as there is to heights,
which were, as cloning was not, a feature of our distant ancestors' environment.
The absence of an instinctual aversion is important because sexual
desire is not the only evolved mechanism for stimulating reproduction.
People love children, particularly their own; so adoption is rarely considered a perfect substitute for having natural children, even though the
natural route will often be more costly for the mother. Parents enjoy noticing physical and mental resemblances between their children and
themselves and thinking of their children as conferring upon themselves
a kind of immortality. This narcissistic tendency, which we call evolved
rather than acculturated because of its universality and its importance to
reproductive fitness-people who don't have a strong preference for
their own children are unlikely to produce many descendants-is likely
to make some people, perhaps a great many people, desire perfect genetic copies of themselves. Very few people prefer to be the parents of
the biological child of another person even if that child is greatly superior to what they themselves could produce, unless they have a deadly
genetic defect. Adoption is a last resort. 5 Some people might therefore
prefer to have a child that was entirely their own, rather than only half
their own, from a genetic standpoint. This preference would be a logical
extension of the well-documented tendency in animal species and
primitive human communities to assist relatives in proportion to the
4. See ROBERT TRIVMRS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 322-30 (1985); William D. Hamilton, Sex
Versus Non-Sex Versus Parasite,35 OKOS 282, 289-90 (1980).
5. See Linda S. Williams, Adoption Actions and Attitudes of Couples Seeking In Vitro
Fertilization:An Exploratory Study, 13 J. FAM. IssuEs 99, 107-08 (1992) (citing studies on adoption attitudes).

HeinOnline -- 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 582 1998-1999

1999]

DEMAND FOR HUMAN CLONING

fraction of shared genes.6 That proportion reaches 100 percent for clones
and identical twins.
In short, why share your genes if you don't have to? We are not
likely to shudder at the thought of cloning ourselves, given the absence
of an instinctual fear of cloning. As for danger from co-evolving parasites, modem medicine has largely banished that concern. Moreover, if
it is a danger, it is one to the health of the human race as a whole rather
than to that of an individual faced with choosing between sexual reproduction and cloning; the clone is unlikely to be more susceptible to infectious disease than his parent.
There are cultural, as distinct from biological, answers to the question, Why share your genes if you don't have to? but they would not
convince everybody to follow the traditional route if cloning were
cheap. One answer is through sexual reproduction you may produce
someone even better than yourself, with the improvement compensating
for the dilution of your genes in the next generation. This answer will
appeal especially to people whose success in life exceeds what one
would have predicted from knowing their genetic endowment. These
people can "buy" the superior genes of a spouse with the financial resources or social prestige that is the fruit of their worldly success. Such
a purchase is especially attractive from the standpoint of reproductive
fitness when the purchaser has some genetic defect that will limit the
reproductive capabilities of his clone.
Another answer to the question, Why dilute your genetic legacy? is
that it is a price of marriage-you will have to give your spouse a share
of "your" children's genes. If this is an attractive trade, presumably because you put a high value on marriage or the particular marriage partner, it means that, as in the previous example, the dilution of your genes
is compensated.
Both examples illustrate the important point that our genetic endowment does not completely determine our behavior. So from the fact
that cloning would often be a way of maximizing the number of copies
of our genes in the next generation it cannot be inferred that the demand
for cloning will be great, even if the monetary cost is modest. Specifically, the demand for human cloning is likely to be concentrated in
people who have "good" genes (by which we mean genes that make it
more likely that a person will have good physical and mental health,
6. See, e.g., TRIVERs, supra note 4, at 41-65, 109-44, 361-94; Matt Ridley & Richard
Dawkins, The Natural Selection of Altruism, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL,
PERSONALrrY, AND DEvELOPMENTAL PERSPECrIVES 19 (J. Philippe Rushton & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981).
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high intelligence or other prized talents, energy, and physical attractiveness, not necessarily genes that maximize reproductive fitness) and
would not derive great benefits from marriage. These will sometimes,
perhaps often, be the same people. Good genes, as we have defined
them, are positively correlated with worldly success, that is, what makes
them "good" in a society such as ours. The more successful a person is,
the better able he will be either to marry on his own terms or to get
along without being married at all. Some of these people will want to
marry anyway, but others will not. Already we observe many people
choosing not to marry. There would be more-and with a tilt not observed today toward the genetically and financially privileged-if human cloning were feasible and cheap. Cloning would thus be "antimarriage," and, even if cheap, would benefit mostly rich men and
women.
In stressing "normal narcissism" as a spur to cloning in cases
where there is no problem of reproductive failure, we may have seemed
to overlook a simpler point: that cloning provides a method of quality
control or assurance. If we think of reproduction as the "purchase" of a
child by its parents, the "product" cannot be observed before it is purchased or its qualities ascertained with any confidence. Cloning overcomes this uncertainty-or does it? The prospective parent may not be
certain how many of his own qualities are due to his genes and how
many to randomly favorable environmental factors that are unlikely to
be duplicated in the upbringing of his clone child. He can reduce this
uncertainty by mating with a person who has similar qualities, since the
probability that the qualities of both persons are the product of luck
rather than genes is less than the probability that the qualities of one of
the two persons are.
From what we have said so far, it should be apparent that analyzing
the demand for cloning and the social effects if the demand is allowed
to be satisfied is difficult and involves many imponderables, even if the
supply of cloning services is unproblematic. Intuition is not a reliable
guide to estimating the consequences of cloning. Consider the most
"obvious" of these consequences: an increase in the birth rate. By providing an alternative to sexual reproduction that some people might prefer, cloning would reduce the total costs of producing children. Yet the
number of children might not increase. Cloning does not just reduce the
cost of having a child, for example, to a person for whom sexual reproduction might be impossible or unappealing; it produces a different kind
of child, namely an identical twin of the parent. Someone who considered this kind superior to a child produced by sexual reproduction might
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decide to have fewer children, substituting perceived quality for quantity.7 This would be especially likely if people generally prefer to have a

child of their own sex, since cloning will produce that every time. Indeed, it seems plausible that people who cloned themselves would generally want to have just one child. The second child would be identical
to the first, and a mixture of clones and sexually produced children
might engender serious tensions. It is possible, therefore, that cloning
would lead to a reduction rather than an increase in the birth rate.
We need a model to help us sort through these issues.
II. A MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR HUMAN CLONING
We begin by assuming that people seek to maximize their children's welfare,8 viewed as an increasing function of the child's genetic
endowment. 9 Imagine a society consisting of 10 people, all adults. For
simplicity, assume that everyone is of the same sex and can mate with
anyone else and that each person has one child either by cloning or in
the usual way; if the latter, the couple has exactly two children, to preserve the ratio of one adult to one child. Each person can be ranked
from 1 to 10, with person 1 having the least desirable genetic endowment and person 10 the highest. A child is assumed to have the average
genetic endowment of its parent(s); therefore, if a person clones himself, his child will have the same genetic endowment as he. Implicitly
this assumes, but plausibly if we confine our attention to just a few generations, that the environment is not changing radically. If it is, the
clone may be less well adapted than the sexually produced child, because the clone's missing parent may have genes better adapted to the
new environment.
Table 1 reveals the payoffs under alternative reproductive regimes:
a regime in which mating is the only option, a regime in which one may
mate or be cloned, and a regime in which only people with a genetic endowment greater than 7 may clone themselves. This last option approximates a world in which the genetically best endowed are also the
wealthiest and only the wealthiest people can afford to be cloned.

7. On the quantity-quality tradeoff in children, see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE

FANULY 145-54 (1991).
8. The assumption is obviously unrealistic, implying as it does that, beyond some age, parents would transfer all their wealth to their children and starve. We relax the assumption later.
9. Another unrealistic, temporary assumption: It abstracts from other constituents of welfare, such as financial resources not due solely to one's genetic makeup.
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TABLE 1
GENETIC ENDOWMENT OF OFFSPRING UNDER
ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTIVE REGIMES
PARENT

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

REPRODUCTIVE REGIME

Mating

Cloning

Cloning > 7

1.5
1.5
3.5
3.5
5.5
5.5
7.5
7.5
9.5
9.5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

0.0
2.5
2.5
4.5
4.5
6.5
6.5
8.0
9.0
10.0

To understand the payoffs under mating, observe that 10 will marry
9, giving their child a genetic endowment of 9.5. This leaves 8 to marry
7, 6 to marry 5, ... 2 to marry 1. Under cloning, 10 will clone himself
because the payoff (10) exceeds the payoff from marrying 9 (9.5).'
While 9 would rather marry 10 than clone himself, 10 is no longer
available. But 9 would rather clone himself (and obtain a 9 child) than
marry 8 and obtain for his (their) child an endowment of only 8.5. This
process will continue all the way to 1, who must clone himself because
there is no one left for him to mate with. When only the genetically
best-endowed people can clone themselves (the last column in the table), all the less well-endowed mate with each other unless, as in l's
case, no one is left for him to mate with.
The model suggests the possibility that the option to clone oneself
could drive out sexual reproduction (except for the occasional contraception failure) and thus the mixing of genes over generations. The genetically best-endowed people in the model clone themselves because
they do not want to mix their genes with people at the next level down.

10. Notice the assumption that 10 knows he is a 10. If there is uncertainty about one's genetic fitness, one may decide to hedge one's bets by mating with a person of similar qualities, as
we noted earlier.
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The people at the next level down do not want to mix their genes with
the people below them, so they clone themselves as well. And this continues all the way to the least well endowed. Cloning would not completely displace sexual reproduction, however, unless it was possible to
determine people's genetic endowments accurately, the preference for
maximizing one's children's genetic endowments overrode all other
preferences, and cloning was not much more costly than sexual reproduction."
Notice that the availability of free cloning would not necessarily
help the genetically best endowed at the expense of the least endowed,
as one might expect. It would make 10 better off, 9 worse off, 8 better
off, 7 worse off, and so on. The availability of free cloning would make
the least well-endowed (types 1-5) worse off as a group only if they
would otherwise marry the best endowed (types 6-10). They would not.
The well endowed would generally marry each other, in order to provide the best genetic endowment for their children, and this would leave
the least endowed to marry each other. 2 Therefore the availability of
cloning would make some well endowed better off and others worse off
and some poorly endowed better off and others worse off.
Even if cloning were expensive, so that only people with a genetic
endowment (and, we are assuming, corresponding wealth) greater than 7
could afford it, the best endowed might not be made better off or the
least endowed worse off. The availability of expensive cloning would
make 9 worse off because it would allow 10 to remove himself from the
marriage pool, eliminating 9's chance of obtaining some of 10's genes
for his offspring. It would also make 7 worse off because 8 would clone
himself. But 7 could no longer marry 8 and so would have to marry 6,
and this would make 6 better off than under either alternative regime.
A risk-neutral person, evaluating the regimes behind the veil of ignorance, would thus be indifferent between no cloning and free cloning
but would prefer either regime to expensive cloning because the average
payoff for the first two regimes is 5.5 and for the third regime is 5.4.
But this (slight) difference arises only because we have assumed that an
odd number of people can afford to clone themselves in a society con11. Another threat posed by cloning to the future of sexual reproduction is considered later
in the Essay.
12. On the tendency to positive assortative mating, see BECKER, supra note 7, at 112-18.
With the breakdown in the United States of traditional cultural barriers to marriage between persons otherwise alike (such as barriers against crossing religious or ethnic lines), assortative mating
is increasingly likely to take a genetic form. Yet even when such barriers are insurmountable, assortative mating along genetic lines takes place behind the barriers, that is, within the segmented
groups.
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sisting of an even number of people, so that person 1 cannot have any
children. This is an artifact of the example.
A risk-averse person might prefer the no-cloning regime to the
free-cloning regime and the free-cloning regime to the expensivecloning regime; for notice that in the table the distribution of payoffs
widens as one moves from left to right. People might fear cloning because they do not like the idea that one could be born into a world in
which one's children are certain to inherit one's bad genes, as opposed
to one in which some mixing is likely. The advantage of mixing to the
risk-averse person is that he gains more from avoiding the worst result
(having the worst genes and passing them on unmixed) than he loses
from not being able to achieve the best result (having the best genes and
passing them on unmixed). But he would have to weigh this gain against
the fact that the no-cloning regime forces him to bear the risk of infertility. If you're infertile, only through cloning can you transmit your
genes to the next generation.
We can enrich the model by assuming that a child's welfare is an
increasing function of his wealth (including the value of his education
prior to adulthood and gifts and bequests from the parent afterward) as
well as of his genetic endowment. We assume diminishing marginal
utility both of genetic endowment and of wealth, so that an equal
amount of each produces more welfare than do unequal amounts.
Imagine that society consists of 100 people, each of whom can be
located within a 10 x 10 matrix, with genetic endowment on one axis
and wealth on the other. Each person is assumed to have a unique
genes-wealth pair, so that, for example, (1,1) denotes a poor person with
bad genes and (10,10) a rich person with good genes. The average child
produced in the usual way will have the average of his parents' genetic
endowments, so that, for example, the mating of (10,10) and (2,4) will
produce on average a (6,7), and for simplicity we'll now drop the qualification "on average" and assume that every child has the average of his
parents' endowments. We define a person's welfare as the sum of the
logarithms of each of his endowments to reflect the diminishing marginal utility of each. For example, welfare for (9,1) is 0.95, whereas for
(5,5) it is 1.40.
Under these assumptions and in a regime of no cloning, the very
highly endowed will marry each other and the least endowed will marry
each other, but rich people with bad genes will marry poor people with
good genes. (10,10) does best by marrying (9,10) or (10,9), while (1,9)
does better by marrying (9,1) than by marrying (5,5), and (5,5) does
better by marrying (6,4) than by marrying (9,1). The match between
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(10,10) and (9,10) produces a child with endowments of (9.5,10) and
welfare, therefore, of 1.98. The match between (1,9) and (9,1) produces
a child with endowments of (5,5) and welfare of 1.40, and the match
between (5,5) and (6,4) produces a child with endowments of (5.5,4.5)
for a welfare of 1.39, while a match between (9,1) and (5,5) produces a
child (7,3) with welfare of 1.32.
In a regime of free cloning, people with equal endowments would
clone themselves (those on the high end by choice, those on the low end
because no one would marry them), although people with unequal endowments would continue to marry each other. The results would not be
much different in a regime of expensive cloning. Again, the high equals
would clone themselves; the unequals, even if wealthy, would marry;
but this time the low equals would have to marry each other rather than
clone. Sexual reproduction would continue to be preferred by many
people. People with good genes but little wealth would want to "trade"
their genes for money in order to have the wherewithal to support and
financially endow their offspring, while wealthy people with poor genes
would want to trade their money for genes. Both types of trade require
sexual reproduction. Yet on fairly ordinary assumptions about what
people desire in their children, many people-all the equals-would
clone themselves, and as a result, the amount of genetic mixing would
decline. And since people who had both great wealth and superb genes
would no longer have to spread their wealth and genetic material in order to have children, cloning might foster the emergence of a genetic
and financial elite.13
I.

THE MODEL FURTHER ENRICHED

We can enrich the model further by asking: What if people could
have as many children as they wanted? In a regime in which cloning is
feasible and permitted, rich people with good genes who wanted to
maximize the welfare of each child would have just one clone and no
other children. The reason is that wealth, as distinct from genes, must be
spread (though not necessarily evenly) among multiple children whether
they are clones or the products of sexual reproduction. But if instead
rich people wanted to maximize the chance that their genes would survive for many generations, the best strategy might be either to have

13. The Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium, in which gene frequencies remain unchanged from
generation to generation, assumes random mating. See, e.g., ELI C. MiNKOFF, EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY 142-44 (1983); MATT RIDLEY, EVOLUTION 87-90 (1993). That is not a realistic assumption for human beings.
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multiple clones, because the extra genetic copies are cheap and only the
wealth must be divided, or to have a few clones and a few ordinary children because a sexual partner with an overall poorer genetic endowment
may still have some superior genes. A few people might wish to clone
other people besides themselves or their children, 4 but we shall ignore
this possibility. Nothing in our analysis depends on whether all people
who want to clone want to clone themselves. A recent poll revealed that
6 percent of the respondents wanted to clone themselves, and apparently
none wanted to clone anyone else."
To the extent that cloning increased the demand for children by offering superior opportunities for maximizing one's influence on the
gene pool, inequalities of wealth would decline because rich people
would have more children among whom to divide their wealth. This
possibility should moderate concern that cloning would increase disparities in wealth, genetic endowment, and overall welfare. But as we
noted earlier, it is by no means certain that cloning would result in more
children. Moreover, cooperation among clones, facilitated by genetic
identity, which should reduce friction (as seems to be the case with
identical twins), might enable the wealth of a family to grow faster than
the number of members.
Let us consider differences between the sexes in the demand for
cloning. Cloning would benefit women more than men, 6 and so the demand for cloning would presumably be greater among women. Cloning
would allow them to have children later in life, enabling them to invest
more in their market skills earlier. 7 Women would be less dependent on
men for support while pregnant or taking care of the children. As a result, there would be fewer marriages; unmarried women would become
wealthier relative to men; married women would have greater bargaining power in marriage. These effects would be multiplied when the
woman had great wealth, good genes, or both. Wealth would allow her
to raise the child alone, and good genes would make her less likely to
find a man with equally good genes. Her benefits from marriage and
sexual reproduction would be small.
Although the availability of cloning would benefit women with
14. Humbert Humbert, for example, might have wanted to clone Lolita.
15. See Clone the Clowns, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 80, 80.
16. This is the general effect of technological improvements in reproduction. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 420-34 (1992).

17. Although they can get the same result by freezing their eggs and hiring a surrogate
mother to incubate them, there is still the problem of obtaining sperm to fertilize them. The woman
may not want to go to the bother of finding a man with good genes to be the father. She can avoid
the bother by going to a sperm bank, but then she is taking a genetic gamble.
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good genes and good market skills, it is less clear that it would benefit
other women. On the one hand, cloning would hurt women by reducing
men's demand for women's fertility. Because a man could have himself
cloned and pay for help in raising the child, he could satisfy his desire to
reproduce himself without enlisting the participation of a woman, save
as the incubator of the clone fetus." This would hurt women who lacked
wealth or good genes, since such a woman would not be able to compensate the man for sharing his children's genes with her by forgoing
cloning. On the other hand, cloning would benefit women by reducing
their dependence on men's fertility. Because a woman could have herself cloned and pay for household help, she could satisfy her desire to
reproduce herself without enlisting the aid of a man. This option would
be available to poor women if welfare paid for the costs of raising clone
children. Moreover, cloning by wealthy women would increase the demand for womb rental by poor women, since there would be little reason for a wealthy woman to carry her clone fetus herself, especially
with no husband to help out.
Gillian Hadfield argues that women and girls (maybe at the urging
of their parents) invest in skills that are complements to the skills ordinarily possessed by men because women with complementary skills are
more desirable marriage partners than women with redundant skills. 9
As evidence, she points out that in all societies men and women specialize in different kinds of work, but that with some exceptions for work
requiring great strength there is little cross-cultural consistency in the
kind of work that men and women do. The availability of cheap cloning
would reduce the importance for women of having complementary
market skills. Girls would no longer be as likely to invest in complementary education; they would invest in whatever education would
maximize their lifetime earnings independently of a husband's career.
The result would be an even more rapid entry of women into areas of
the workforce traditionally dominated by men than we are observing today.
Human cloning might thus portend an accelerating breakdown in
the traditional roles of men and women and facilitate the emergence of a
class of wealthy and powerful women-both disturbing prospects to
men and women who hold traditional views of sex roles.
18. A current in ancient Greek thought represented by Aeschylus and Aristotle. They believed that all children were the father's clone-that the woman's role in reproduction was limited
to incubation.
19. See Gillian K. Hadfield, A Coordination Model of the Sexual Division of Labor (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Toronto Law School).
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To summarize the discussion to this point, cloning would benefit
mainly wealthy women with good genes and to a lesser extent wealthy
men with good genes. One would therefore expect, if human cloning
were feasible and permitted, a growing concentration of wealth and
highly desired heritable characteristics at the top end of the distribution
of these goods and fewer marriages there. Although the rest of the
population distribution would be made relatively worse off as a group,
many people within that part of the distribution would be made better
off, including people with incurable infertility.
But the model is still too abstract. Wealth, genetic endowment, risk
aversion, fertility, and sexual difference are not the only important variables bearing on the demand for and consequences of cloning. Here is a
mundane but frightening point: The demand for cloning would be disproportionately concentrated in people whose narcissism exceeded
normal bounds, and, more generally, in people who today are prevented
from (or rather impeded in) reproducing by being unmarriageable,
usually because of severe personality disorders. Normal people want to
mate with other normal people, not with people who are psychotic; and
psychotics themselves probably do not want to mate with other psychotics, and often do not want to mate or associate with anyone, since difficulty of establishing personal relationships is a symptom of a disordered
personality.Y Extreme narcissists in particular would probably not want
to marry anyone, save on terms intolerable to any self-respecting person -- especially another narcissist! Other types of men and women
who today have diffictlty finding mates include mentally retarded people, people with serious physical disabilities, convicted felons, homosexuals, pedophiles, and sociopaths. Men despairing of or rejecting
marriage (or simply wanting to have more children than is feasible
through sexual reproduction in a society that outlaws polygamy) who
wanted to clone themselves would still have to rent a womb, and that
would create some constraint, even though the necessity of finding a
mate would be eliminated. Women who cloned themselves would be
self-sufficient; they would have merely to bear the cost of pregnancy.
Concern about clones carrying defective genes and raised by disordered
persons might engender pressure for governmental screening of people
who wanted to clone themselves, thus raising the spectre of eugenic
regulation. This would be an example of how technology, by eliminat-

20. See AMERIcAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTALDISORDERs (DSM-IV) 638-42 (4th ed. 1994).
21. See ARNOLD ROmSTmIN, THE NARcISSSTIc PURSUIT OF PERFECriON 87 (1980).
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ing a social or biological barrier to an activity, can increase the optimal
scope of government.
Persons with extraordinary talents having a large genetic component, such as champion athletes and world-class musicians, might be
tempted to clone themselves. If so, then over time the economic rents
obtained by persons who have scarce and highly valued genetic endowments would decline-an income-equalizing effect of cloning. An
esoteric but important class of potential demanders for cloning are dictators, who might believe that problems of succession would be lessened
if a clone were waiting in the wings. Imagine if when Stalin died a 50year-old Stalin clone had been Stalin's designated successor; imagine if
today Fidel Castro had a 50-year-old clone.
An important variable in the demand for human cloning is the desire of most people to marry. As we noted earlier, they are unlikely to be
able to do so if they are "gene selfish." In addition, most people do not
seek to produce a child who is merely financially and genetically well
endowed, but one who is happy, and most people believe that happier
children have two parents. What is more, because of economies of scale
and specialization within the household, it is less than twice as expensive for a couple to raise two children than for a single parent to raise
one. Against these points it can be noted that the desire to marry is in
part a function of the desire for children. The more the desire for children can be satisfied by alternative arrangements, the less demand there
will be for marriage. And cloning can be reconciled with marriage and
dual parenting in the following way: The married couple can decide that
rather than producing two children sexually they will each clone. This is
not a perfect solution for them. Because a person is more closely related
to his clone than to his sexually reproduced children, and a fortiori to
his spouse's clone, to whom indeed he is not related at all, each spouse
may have difficulty thinking of himself or herself as a parent of both
children; so dual cloning may not produce dual parenting.
We can put this differently. The man who "sells" his wife a genetic
half-interest in "his" children gets in return more than someone who
will take a share (maybe the lion's share) in the rearing of the children.
He gets a child rearer who has a superior motivation to do a good job
precisely because of the genetic bond. Altruism is a substitute for market incentives, and the man can take advantage of this substitute by
giving his wife a genetic stake in the children.' So marriage and sexual

22. Important evidence for this is the enormously increased risk of child abuse by stepparents compared to parents. See MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMIcm 83-93 (1988).
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reproduction would remain for many, probably for most, persons a superior alternative to cloning, even if cloning were not only lawful but
also very cheap.
Many people, moreover, want to have children that differ from
them in important (genetic) respects. They wish to improve their stock,
which they cannot do by cloning themselves, or to hedge against the
risk that their own genes are not as good as they think. Even if they are
preoccupied with, or driven subliminally by their genes to maximize,
their inclusive fitness, they can do this as well by having two children
each of whom shares half their genes as by having two children one of
whom shares all their genes and the other (the spouse's clone) none.
And it is impossible to know whether people would find cloning an
attractive option until we know what a clone would be like. A clone
might seem disappointingly different from his parent, or eerily similar;
in either case, people might prefer sexual reproduction. And we have
not taken into account possible social responses to cloning. If cloning
led to an extraordinarily unequal distribution of wealth, society might
respond by imposing highly progressive taxes. It might even place an
excise tax on cloning. Then adverse effects on wealth distribution would
not be compelling arguments against the availability of cloning-unless
the costs of social measures to reduce the distributive effects of cloning
were great, which they might be.
In a discussion of an imagined but no longer unforeseeable reproductive technology that would allow a husband and wife to choose
which of their genes to give to their child, Thomas Schelling points out
that people might compete over characteristics.2 They might, for example, choose taller children in the hope of giving them competitive
advantages. But their hope would be dashed because all children would
become taller, assuming many other parents also had a preference for
tall children. Because cloning gives people less power over the genetic
characteristics of their children, the danger of such a zero-sum competition is less. But the general point still holds. To the extent that genetic
endowment is a positional good, competition over it does not produce
social gains; in contrast, competition in the market produces social gains
because market goods are, for the most part, nonpositional, at least if
envy is ignored.
Schelling's point raises the general question of the effect of cloning
on the clones themselves. Earlier we assumed that parents want to
maximize their children's welfare. This is an unrealistic assumption.
23.

See THOMAS C. SCHELLNG, MICROMOTVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 193-210 (1978).
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Rational parents want to maximize their own welfare, and thus their
children's only to the extent that the children's welfare enters into the
parents' utility function. So we cannot assume, at least when people
have a choice between cloning and sexual reproduction, that their children's welfare will be maximized by the choice made.
Setting to one side biological uncertainties that we assume will
eventually be dispelled,24 the clone will be a perfectly normal human
being, as normal as an identical twin. But the vertical relation of genetic
identity has different implications from the horizontal relation. Take the
case in which a married couple decides to have two clones, one of each
spouse, rather than producing children sexually. If the clones then clone
themselves, the original husband and wife will have the same genetic
relationship to their grandchildren as to their children, while their children will have no genetic relationship to each other and also their
grandchildren no genetic relationship to each other. If the (unrelated)
children marry each other and co-produce a child, the original husband
will have a closer relationship with his grandchild than with the cloned
child he has through his wife. Or suppose a husband and a wife coproduce a child and then clone the child while he is still an infant. Is the
clone the child's sibling or the child's child? Is he the father's child or
the father's grandchild? If the clone grows up and clones himself, the
original husband and wife will have the same genetic relationship to
their grandchild as they have to their child. In these examples, cloning
might run up against the deep-seated incest taboo, though this is speculative.
IV.

IN THE VERY LONG TERM

We consider, finally, some highly speculative long-term effects of
human cloning. One is that it might reduce the genetic diversity of the
human race by facilitating eugenic breeding. Imagine: Parents coproduce a child, who at the age of three manifests signs of great precocity. They clone this child rather than co-produce another child. Or parents have two children and clone the better-looking or more intelligent
one. Fertile parents who share a common genetic defect or infertile parents who have genetic defects may choose to clone superior relatives or,
indeed, to purchase the right to clone other people who have desirable
24. These are lucidly described in the Economist article. See Whatever Next?, supra note 2,
at 80-81. For example, it is uncertain whether a mammal cloned from nonreproductive tissue
would have a normal lifespan; the clone's biological age might be the sum of its and its parent's
chronological ages.
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genes, although that tendency will be retarded by the preference for own
over adopted children. Because cloning involves a smaller genetic
gamble than does a combination of sperm and egg of even highly desirable strangers, cloning would be preferred to artificial insemination or
surrogate motherhood by those attracted to the idea of selective breeding. To the extent that selection was in favor of a few widely desired
features, and against the widely undesired, human genetic diversity
would decrease, with obvious risks to human adaptability to unforeseeable changes in the environment that might make currently undesirable
traits more valuable and currently desirable traits less valuable.
In cultures in which boys are valued more than girls, parents might
decide to clone the father or, having co-produced a son, to clone that
son rather than risk having daughters. Over time, sex ratios could
change dramatically.' This process may be self-correcting in the long
run, because girls will become more valued offspring as the ratio of
males to females rises. Even so, the inevitable lags in the self-correcting
process might cause grave social dislocations and incite demands for
intrusive government regulation of reproductive decisions, 6 for which
we now have ample precedent in East Asia. Asked to correct an undesirable sex ratio, government would have to choose some legal instrument. Maybe it would tax the cloning of men but not the cloning of
women, or tax cloning but not co-production. Since wealthier people
would have more clones than poorer people, a tendency accelerated by
the tax, wealthier people would have relatively more boys. And once it
became acceptable for the government to influence cloning, could interest groups resist using the government to encourage the cloning of some
people (geniuses?) but not others (the genetically defective)? We would
then be in the much-feared world of eugenic regulation.
Earlier we showed that cloning might have a tendency to crowd out
sexual reproduction. The more people clone, the fewer people are available for sexual reproduction; the pool of potential reproductive partners
shrinks, and it becomes more difficult to produce a superior child by reproduction than by cloning. A different path of crowding out is opened
if we consider the possible long-term consequences of even the relatively benign public policy with which we began this Essay: permitting
only infertile couples to clone themselves. Currently, mutant genes that
interfere with sexual reproduction cannot be propagated; infertile people
do not have offspring. When cloning becomes available, the genes that

25. See SCHEUJNG, supranote 23, at 197-203.
26. See Ud at 202-03.
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enable sexual reproduction will lose their survival advantage over genes
that interfere with sexual reproduction. Imagine a society consisting of
50 men and 50 women. Assume that in every generation 2 percent of the
people (for simplicity, one man and one woman) are infertile because of
a condition that is heritable. Assume everyone marries and the average
couple has 2.04 children (for example, 48 couples have two children and
one couple has 4 children). In a world without cloning, the genes of the
infertile people will not be reproduced, and every generation will replace itself by producing 100 children. Now suppose that cloning becomes available. Each generation's infertile couples will have on average 2.04 (cloned) children, who will be infertile (for we are discussing
cases in which infertility is caused by an inherited defect). So while the
first generation will consist of 98 fertile people and 2 infertile people,
the second generation will consist of 98 fertile people and 4 infertile
people, and the third generation of 98 fertile people and 6 infertile people. In five generations, clones would constitute almost 10 percent of
the population; eventually they would be dominant.27
It is not clear whether sexual reproduction would eventually disappear. On the one hand, random mutations would interfere with sexual
reproduction but would not interfere with the cloning of infertile people-a crucial asymmetry. And as the percentage of fertile people fell,
the costs of matching would rise because the population of potential
mates would be small. On the other hand, the mixing of genes that results from sexual reproduction may enhance survival, even under the
environmentally gentler conditions brought about by modem medicine.
As long as clones must be incubated in human wombs (which may
not be for long, for artificial wombs are being developed), infertile men
and women would generally (depending on the nature of the woman's
infertility) have to pay fertile womene to bear their clones. If as a result
these women did not reproduce themselves, infertility would spread
even more rapidly than in our numerical example. It is true that if infertile individuals married fertile individuals and the couple decided to
have only the fertile partner cloned, the genes for infertility would not
be reproduced. But it is more likely that the infertile partner would demand that at least one child be his or her clone; the preference for costly

27. Cf. MICHAEL Buss, THE DIscovERY OF INsuLIN 245 (1982) ("Because insulin enabled
diabetics to live and propagate, and because the disease had a strong hereditary component, the
effect of the discovery of insulin was to cause a steady increase in the number of diabetics.").
28. Fertile in the sense of being able to carry a fetus to term; they might be infertile in the
sense of being unable to produce an egg. The discussion in the text assumes that all women are
either fertile or infertile in both senses.

HeinOnline -- 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 597 1998-1999

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:579

and painful reproductive technologies over adoption attests to the importance that people attach to genetic reproduction (what we earlier discussed as normal narcissism). So each infertile person might make
clones of himself or herself without matching up with anyone else, or
might marry another infertile person and share the burden of raising two
clones.
People can clone themselves faster than they can produce children
through sexual reproduction, which imposes a delay of more than nine
months between children. Because of the strong incentives that many
modem women have to delay childbearing until late in life, this might
give cloning a great advantage over sexual reproduction. Perhaps great
enough to increase the birth rate of the infertile over the fertile, assuming cloning were practiced only by the former. To take an extreme example, if infertile couples clone themselves once (that is, produce two
clones) in the time that a fertile couple takes to have one child, and if
time between births is the only constraint on reproduction, then starting
in our world of 100 people of whom 2 are infertile, infertile clones
would outnumber fertile people in about five generations.
Our estimates of the possible effects of cloning on fertility are, of
course, highly sensitive to the percentage of persons having heritable
infertility. The percentage is not known. It is undoubtedly only a small
fraction of all persons who are infertile, because genes that cause infertility are maladaptive and hence highly likely to be selected out in the
course of evolution. The number of persons with fertility problems,
heritable or nonheritable, is unknown, because only people who are
trying and failing to have a child (and not all of them) seek medical attention for such problems. Infertility, moreover, is often a function of
the couple, each member of which might be fertile with another sexual
partner. It has, however, been estimated that at least 20 percent of fertility problems are male and that 10 percent to 20 percent of these are genetic.29 Assuming a like percentage of genetic female infertility problems (for which, however, we have not been able to find any
substantiation), 10 percent to 20 percent of all fertility problems are genetic. The higher figure may be consistent with the estimate we used
earlier that 2 percent of couples have heritable fertility problems. An
estimated 7.1 percent of married couples have fertility problems,"0 and
this is clearly an underestimate, not only because noncomplainers are
29. SeeD M de Kretser, Male Infertility, 349 LANcEr 787 (1997).
30. See Joyce C. Abna et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Women's Health: New Data
from the 1995 NationalSurvey of Family Growth, in VrrAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 7 (DHHS
Publication No. 97-1995, 1997).
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not counted but also because people who know themselves to be infertile are less likely to marry. On the other hand, fertility problems often
merely delay rather than prevent conception and birth, and often are
treatable; so 2 percent may be too high after all. But since random genetic mutations can cause a fertile person to become infertile, while it is
extremely unlikely that a random mutation would cause an already infertile person to become fertile, it may not be crucial whether 2 percent
of the population is afflicted with mutations that impair infertility or 0.2
percent or even 0.002 percent. Infertility will spread like a virus, merely
at different rates, and eventually drive off fertility.
The spread of infertility through cloning might be even more rapid
if, as realism requires, "reproductive failure" were defined broadly
enough to encompass the situation of a homosexual couple, for whom
cloning might be an attractive alternative to adoption, artificial insemination (if it is a lesbian couple), or surrogate motherhood (if it is a male
homosexual couple). Assuming that all or most homosexual orientation
is genetic,' the fraction of homosexual genes in the gene pool would be
increased if cloning resulted in a disproportionate increase in reproduction by homosexuals, who might be thought "functionally" infertile to
the extent that they do not reproduce sexually. But this depends on the
transmission path of the homosexual gene. If the gene predisposing to
male homosexuality is through the female line,32 then male homosexuals
will not transmit the gene to their clones.
Is the spread of infertility throughout the population something to
be feared, when, by assumption, people are able to reproduce using
cloning technologies? As noted earlier, the evolutionary advantage of
sexual over asexual reproduction is that the mixing of genes protects
future generations against co-evolving parasites. If everyone cloned
himself, future generations would have the same genetic diversity as the
current generation; so parasites that evolved the capacity to crack the
immunological defenses of members of the current generation would
pose a threat to the members of future generations who were their
clones. And if some people cloned themselves more than others, future
generations would have less genetic diversity than the current generation. Genetic diversity, like vaccination, is a barrier to the spread of

31. For a summary of the evidence, which however is largely limited to male homosexuality,
see Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Homosexuality, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND
FAMILy: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 173, 186, 191 n.26 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
32. See Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and
Male Sexual Orientation,261 Sct. 321, 325 (1993).
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parasites. Like the person who refuses to be vaccinated, the person who
clones himself does not internalize all the costs of his behavior. Unless
medical technology evolves as quickly as parasites do, over time the
human race could find itself increasingly vulnerable to disease.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our exploration of the likely demand for human cloning has been
strictly that-exploratory. The demand is impossible to estimate; it depends on too many variables of uncertain strength. But the analysis does
provide a rational basis for the widespread disquiet that the prospect of
human cloning has aroused. Some of that disquiet has religious or emotional foundations that our analysis does not touch; some of it reflects
an unreasoning fear of change. But consider: The most sympathetic demanders for human cloning, the infertile, may, over time, if allowed to
clone, drive out sexual reproduction. The least sympathetic demanders,
extreme narcissists and other psychotics and misfits, will be among the
most enthusiastic for cloning, and their cloning too will feed on itself to
the extent that the disorder that makes them unmarriageable is hereditary.3 The point is not that cloning frees each sex from dependence on
the other, though it does (women more clearly than men, however, since
a womb is still necessary), but that it eliminates the barrier to reproduction that is created by the need to find another person willing to mate
with you. That barrier is a screen against reproduction by people with
serious maladjustments.
Cloning may also aggravate inequalities in genetic endowment and
in wealth, undermine the already imperiled institution of marriage, alter
the sex ratio, and create irresistible pressures for eugenic regulation.
This is on the one hand. On the other hand, some of the frightening effects of cloning may be offsetting: If as we speculate, cloning will increase the wealth and power of women, the demand for daughters may
rise, canceling out a preference for sons that cloning might enable parents to indulge. And some of the effects are so long run that technological advances of the very kind that have given us cloning may eliminate
them: Long before the population becomes dominated by infertile and
narcissistic clones, infertility and extreme narcissism may be as passe as
smallpox. In other words, fertility technology and psychiatric medicine
may advance as rapidly and as far as cloning technology. Perhaps, then,
despite the concerns discussed in this Essay, only the very cautious will
33. One can also envisage a demand for clones on the part of people who want a source of
"spare parts" for organ transplants and other medical needs.
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want to prohibit human cloning.
ADDENDUM: THE DEMAND FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING

Since we wrote the original version of this Essay in the fall of
1997, advances in reproductive technology have continued unabated.
Two developments are of particular interest. The first is the cloning of
cows and mice.34 These achievements lay to rest some doubts about
whether human cloning would ever be achievable, doubts that arose in
part because of controversy over the cloning techniques used to create
Dolly. The cloning of cows and mice shows that nothing specific to
sheep makes them uniquely amenable to cloning. Although we wrote
our Essay in a speculative spirit, the recent advances in cloning suggest
that even the "very long term," as we called it, is not far away. 35
The second development concerns genetic engineering. As some
scientists have pointed out, the controversy over human cloning has
drawn attention away from advances in genetic engineering, which is
likely to be a more important reproductive technology than human
cloning is. The book, Clones and Clones, and this symposium conference probably reflect the greater salience of human cloning, and-to be
fair-the fact that human cloning is likely to occur sooner than significant genetic engineering.36 We thought, however, that we would use this
34. See Gina Kolata, Japanese Scientists Clone a Cow, Making Eight Copies, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 9, 1998, at A8.
35. At this writing, there is a report that human cloning has been achieved in a Korean hospital. However, the research has not yet been reviewed by other scientists. See Sheryl WuDunn,
South Korean Scientists Say They Cloned a Human Cell,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at A12.
36. See CLONES AND CLONES: FACrs AND FANTASIES ABOuT HUMAN CLONING (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998). There has been a surge in legal scholarship about human cloning over the last year. We do not have the space to discuss it in any detail. The scholarship focuses on: (1) whether there is or should be a constitutional right to clone oneself; (2)
whether cloning is immoral; (3) whether cloning should be illegal; (4) whether and how to protect
patients' genetic information; and (5) the scope of the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA")
authority over human cloning. A sample of the recent scholarship includes: John Finnis, Public
Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAt. U. L. REV. 361 (1998) (criticizing human cloning on
moral grounds); Heidi Forster & Emily Ramsey, Legal Responses to the Potential Cloning of Hu-

man Beings, 32 VAt. U. L. REV. 433 (1998) (surveying efforts to regulate or discourage research
in and, potentially, the practice of human cloning); Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have
Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619 (1998) (discussing FDA
authority over human cloning); John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1371 (1998) (arguing for the need for regulation); Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning
Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fundamental Right?, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1461 (1998)

(asserting a constitutional right to clone). There have been three symposia on the legal implications of human cloning. See Symposium, 32 VAL. U. L. REv 383 (1998); Symposium, Privacy,
Property & Family in the Age of Genetic Testing, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 551 (1998); Symposium
on Cloning, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 87 (1998).
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opportunity to discuss how advances in genetic engineering might alter
some of the conclusions in our original Essay about human cloning.
Genetic engineering involves the actual manipulation of genetic
material in embryos. Existing technology allows scientists to inject deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") into the single embryonic cell that exists
shortly after fertilization of the egg. 7 When the cell divides, the incorporated DNA is replicated along with the original DNA, so that every
cell of the developing organism's body will contain the new DNA, and
this DNA will be passed on to its offspring." There are currently many
problems with this procedure, including the fact that the location on the
existing DNA to which the foreign DNA hooks itself cannot be predicted, so that sometimes the new DNA will interfere with functional
genes.39 The result is that the current technology has a high rate of error,
too high for the purpose of human genetic engineering. Another problem is that this procedure enables one to add new genes but not to replace or eliminate existing genes that are undesirable. 4 But new procedures are being developed. One promising procedure involves the
insertion of the foreign DNA in undifferentiated embryonic stem cells,
which can be grown in the laboratory, so that the failures can be discarded and the successes can be implanted in the womb.4 Scientists appear to believe that this method or some other method
of human genetic
42
engineering will be practical in a matter of decades
We mentioned in the original Essay that some of our concerns in
the "very long term" may be addressed by advances in reproductive
technology. One of these concerns is that as human cloning becomes
more popular, sexual reproduction will decline and human beings will
become an asexually reproducing species. This is a concern only if sexual reproduction is adaptive for human beings, something that would
seem obvious but that has not been adequately explained. One textbook
notes that
sex will obviously be good at putting together certain combinations of
genes at different loci, then breaking these up and putting together another combination, then a third or back to the first, and so on. If this is
what the environment is, in fact, demanding, then sex will do well

37. See LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND INA BRAVE NEW WORLD
229-30 (1997).
38. See id. at 230.
39. See id at 231.
40. See id at 232.
41. See idat231.
42. See id. at 233.
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against asexuality, any gene in an asexual individual being stuck in an
unchangeable alliance....
The most likely interactions to generate the required rapid cycles
are those between parasite and host. Remember that a species may be
preyed upon by only a few species, but invariably it will be parasitized
by hundreds of viruses, bacteria, protozoa, and so on. These parasitic
species may evolve for hundreds of generations during the lifetime of
rapidly become good
a single host, so it is to be expected that they will
3
at exploiting the commonest host genotypes!
There is a loose analogy in the genetic engineering of crops. Farmers have found it advantageous to use genetically uniform crops (such as
corn), even though uniformity makes crops susceptible to disease. When
crops are uniform, a pest that can prey on the crop will rapidly reproduce and spread across the field. By contrast, when crops are not uniform, a pest that preys on one variety of the crop will destroy a pocket
of the field but will not spread beyond its boundaries. Farmers prefer the
uniform crop because of its superior qualities, and use large quantities
of pesticide to ward off pests. Some scientists urge farmers to rely less
on pesticide, and to rely instead on more genetically diverse crops as a
barrier to the spread of disease, but farmers have been reluctant to give
up the benefits of uniformity.' It is not clear whether their resistance is
due to the greater efficiency of pesticides or to the externalizing of
costs. To use a slightly different example, Monsanto recently developed
a genetically engineered form of corn that is resistant to a particular,
very harmful pest, the corn borer.45 Some scientists fear that the corn
borer will evolve resistance to the crop unless farmers reserve as much
as 20 percent of their land to the non-resistant strains of the crop. The
purpose of this strategy is to deprive mutants that are resistant to the
pesticide of a significant evolutionary advantage over the non-resistant
corn borers, so that the mutants will not reproduce in large numbers.
Farmers reject this proposal, arguing that the scientists overstate their
fears, but it may be that farmers are willing to risk the development of
mutants because much of the cost will be born by other (and future)
farmers.
Widespread human cloning would not result in genetic uniformity,

43.
44.
U. MEM.
45.
1998).
46.

TIUVERS, supra note 4, at 324.

See David R. Pumell, InternationalImplications of New AgriculturalBiotechnology, 25
L. REv. 1189, 1194-95 (1995).
See New Efforts to Protect Crops (National Public Radio Morning Edition, Nov. 13,
See id.
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unless only a single human being were cloned-unless, for example,
everyone decided to clone a famous athlete or leader rather than clone
themselves or reproduce sexually. This is highly unlikely. But human
cloning would result in a decline in genetic diversity. If everyone cloned
himself rather than reproducing sexually, then future generations would
have the same genetic distribution as current generations. If some people-for example, wealthier people-cloned themselves more frequently than other people do, then genetic diversity would decline over
time though it would not disappear. The question is whether the decline
in genetic diversity would be great enough to make humans more susceptible to co-evolving parasites, just as the decline in genetic diversity
of crops make them more susceptible to disease. This question raises the
further question of whether advances in medicine can be expected to
solve this problem, or whether genetic engineering will be able to solve
this problem. It may be that genetic engineering will enable fertility
clinics to produce offspring that are, in all visible and important respects, identical to their parents while at the same time intervening to
produce some random genetic mixing that will maintain enough genetic
diversity to restrain the spread of disease.
To the extent that people want pure clones, however, they will be
reluctant to submit to genetic mixing. Genetic mixing, like vaccination
and crop diversity, produces external benefits that the consumer or producer has no incentive to pay for. If everyone else is mixing genes, then
I can afford to have a pure clone, for my clone will be protected by
other people's genetic diversity. This may create a demand for government intervention, similar to government mandated or subsidized vaccination programs.
We also mentioned in the original Essay that we expected "natural"
fertility to decline over time. Assuming that random mutations occasionally render infertile the offspring of genetically fertile people, over
time genetic infertility will spread throughout the population as cloning
becomes more popular. One might argue that genetic engineering would
eliminate this problem, but it is not clear that this is likely. The repair of
genetic infertility is more complicated than the mixing of genes for the
purpose of enhancing resistance to disease. To repair genetic infertility,
scientists would first have to develop a much greater understanding of
the genetic basis of human reproduction. In addition, people may have
no incentive to ensure that their children are genetically fertile when
cheap reproductive technologies are available. In the future, in vitro
fertilization may be so routine, along with any genetic manipulations
that are desired, that people will not bother to ensure that their children
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have the ability to reproduce sexually, and over time this form of reproduction would die out. People will be like mules, infertile but able to be
reproduced because of the intervention of technology.
We now turn from the question of the demand for human cloning,
to the question of the demand for genetic engineering. We start by
making a correction to our original argument in light of developments in
genetic engineering. Couples will not clone fathers or sons for the sole
purpose of producing sons. It is now technologically possible to choose
the sex of one's child. The question is what exactly will be the demand
for human genetic engineering, and what consequences might this demand have for society?
One possibility is that parents will choose for their children traits
that are in great demand and that are genetically determined. The recurrent example is height. If tall people are more attractive and successful
than short people, then parents will choose to have tall children. 47 Certain aspects of intelligence, beauty, strength, endurance, and perhaps
judgment and temperance, may also have strong enough genetic links
that parents can select for them as well.
Before we envision a race of supermen, however, a few words of
caution are in order. First, one must confront the problem of "design
space."4 Natural selection has already made tradeoffs among different
qualities. As a person becomes taller, he may become more susceptible
to injury from falls; his heart must work harder; he may lose coordination. As a person becomes stronger, his muscular mass might detract
from the functioning of various organs. Scientists have long suspected a
connection between artistic creativity and mental illness. Perhaps, the
person genetically engineered to have great powers of imagination will
also be more susceptible to hallucination. Another well-known example
is the sickle cell, which protects humans against malaria but also produces sickle cell anemia. Modem "human selection" that will replace
natural selection will no doubt result in a different kind of human being,
but it would be a mistake to think that the optimal person of the future
will simply be a person whose qualities are exaggerated versions of the
qualities that we currently admire-because as people become taller,
stronger, and more creative, they will also become more susceptible to
injury, mental illness, and other problems. More likely, the optimal person will simply be more attuned to the modem environment than to the
prehistoric African savanna.

47. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
48. See DANEELDENNETr, DARWiN'S DANGEROUS IDEA (1996).

HeinOnline -- 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 605 1998-1999

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:579

Second, the "optimal" human being will be a function of an everchanging environment, and a part of this environment is the set of other
"optimal" human beings that will exist. We cannot predict that people
will become uniform. Let us consider a fanciful example. Robert Frank
has argued that blushing and other involuntary physiological responses
are evolved mechanisms of trust.49 In the savanna, just as today, humans
do better as a group if they cooperate with each other, but every individual does best if he cheats others while the others try to cooperate
with him. For example, it is best if everyone in a group alerts others if
he sees a predator, and worse for the group (but best for the individual)
if he occasionally produces false alarms that cause other members of the
group to flee, leaving the individual free to exploit some resource that
group members were competing for. If I blush when I falsely promise to
raise the alarm only when appropriate, then others will not trust me, and
I will be thrown out of the group. Blushing evolves as a way of showing
others that one can be trusted.
But the story is more complicated. Some people blush more than
others; it also requires some cost (in perception and concentration) to
determine whether a person is blushing. Imagine that at time zero everyone blushes if he intends to cheat. If people know that the entire
population consists of such blushing cooperators, they will not bother to
expend energy to examine people's faces when they promise to sound
the alarm and do other good things for the group. This creates an opportunity for mutant strains. These strains blush faintly, and the difference
between the real and the faint blushes can be perceived only at a certain
cost. Because the other members of the group think that just about everyone is a cooperator, the deviant will not be examined, and will be able
to cheat. His payoffs will be higher than those of the cooperators, so
over time he will reproduce at a greater rate. Now suppose that almost
the entire population consists of people who blush lightly and do not
cooperate. Now it pays for people to examine each other carefully. A
mutant strain of heavily blushing cooperators will develop a comparative advantage. People will examine each other carefully, and prefer to
rely on the heavily blushing cooperators. The latter, receiving higher
payoffs, will reproduce at a greater rate than the defectors. Depending
on the assumptions one makes, over time the various strategies may
spread or contract, and under certain conditions there may emerge an
evolutionarily stable equilibrium in which there is a population that

49. See ROBERT
EMOTIONS 8-9 (1988).

H. FRANK, PASSIONS "VmIiN REASON: THE STRATEGic ROLE OF THE
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consists partly of heavily blushing cooperators and partly of lightly
blushing defectors."
The point of this example is to show that genetic engineering will
not necessarily lead to genetic uniformity, any more than natural selection leads to genetic uniformity in nature. People's genetic choices for
their children will depend on other people's genetic choices, to be sure,
but sometimes it will be advantageous to choose genes that are different
from other people's genes. Parents of the future may well have to
choose how transparent their children's intentions will be. They will
want their children to be trustworthy, so they might want their children
to blush easily. But they will not want their children to be easily taken
advantage of, so they might want their children to be able to conceal
their emotions. The optimal choice will depend on how many other
people can conceal their emotions or not. The more people there are
who can conceal their emotions, the more valuable the opportunities of
a child who cannot. The more people who cannot conceal their emotions, the more valuable the opportunities of a child who can.
We might expect the children of the future to be the victims of fads
that overtake their parents. Today, a hit movie will spawn a brood of
children named after its star; tomorrow, a hit movie might spawn a
brood of children who resemble its star. People's perceptions of beauty
are influenced by their surroundings. Any passing trend-the
"anorexic" model, blond hair and blue eyes, a skin tone, a tone of
voice-may be unconsciously passed by parents to their children as they
select characteristics at a fertility clinic. Thus we do not need to assume
that parents consciously want their children to look like a movie star;
only that when they choose among genes, their sense of beauty will be
influenced by what they have seen at the movies. Is this a bad thing? It's
hard to know. Generations of children suffer from the once fashionable
names bestowed on them by their well-meaning parents; will they suffer
if they all resemble some movie star who has long since sunk into
oblivion?
Another locus of genetic competition may be race and skin color.
Minorities who suffer from discrimination on the basis of their appearance will be tempted to influence the appearance of their future children. For example, well-meaning black parents might engineer children
whose skin is slightly lighter than their own. They might believe that in
a discriminatory society this will increase the child's future opportunities without at the same time erasing the child's racial identity. How50. See id. at 57-63.
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ever, over time it will become impossible to distinguish the races. Racial discrimination will end. This prediction is not, of course, certain.
Blacks and other racial groups may resist this trend out of ethnic pride.
Indeed, as we pointed out above, there may be advantages, especially in
certain communities, in having characteristics that differ from those of
most people. Moreover, the prediction depends on genetic engineering
being cheap and readily available. If genetic engineering is expensive,
then one might foresee that wealthy people will produce intelligent and
beautiful offspring, which over time will become steadily genetically
distinct from the offspring of poor people, until there are two entirely
different species that cannot reproduce sexually.51 Thus, even if racial
discrimination ends, new forms of discrimination may rise in its place,
including discrimination that is a consequence of choices people make
about the genetic makeup of their offspring.
A final point concerns the future relations of parents and children.
We have been assuming that parents will act to maximize the opportunities of their future children, but parents have their own interests as
well. Evolutionary biologists have long noted the competition between
children and parents. The elder child wants no sibling, because the
younger sibling diverts the attention of the parents; the parents want
multiple children in order to minimize the risk that no child will survive
and reproduce. Similarly, in the world of genetic engineering a parent
might believe that his child will do best if he can conceal his intentions
from others, but still prefer a child with transparent intentions because,
after all, he must raise that child! A parent might also want a diverse
brood: if he has two "perfect" children who are highly likely to reproduce and live successful but dull lives, why not diversify and have a
third child, who has a highly strung artistic temperament that may produce greatness but also failure? People rationally diversify their financial investments; why wouldn't they also diversify among high-risk,
high-return children, and low-risk, low-return children?
Advances in genetic technology create a world of promise and opportunity, but there is a fairy-tale like twist. People are given the great
power to influence identity and destiny by manipulating genes. But they
cannot manipulate their own genes. The power can be used only for the
benefit, or detriment, of someone else.

51. See SILVER, supra note 37, at 4-7.
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